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This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that 
are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary 
technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing 
other system components. This hold-up potential induces firms to preemptively claim stakes 
on component property rights and excessively cluster their R&D efforts on a relatively easier 
technology. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several model extensions. 
Implications for the optimal design of intellectual property rights are discussed. We also 
analyze selection biases that arise when firms differ in research capabilities. 
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This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary innovations.
In the presence of complementarity, patents allow innovating ￿rms to hold up rivals who
succeed in developing other system components. This hold-up potential induces ￿rms to
preemptively stake claims on component property rights and excessively cluster their R&D
e⁄ort on a relatively easier technology. With the convergence of digital technologies, a
typical product in today￿ s high-tech industries encompasses multiple complementary inno-
vations. For instance, a cell phone can employ a variety of technologies covered by di⁄erent
patents in the areas of wireless communication, digital technology, high speed broadband,
and so on. The importance of complementary technologies can also be inferred by nu-
merous patent suits and cross-licensing agreements among major players in the industry.
The analysis thus has important implications for the optimal design of intellectual property
rights in this new technological environment of digital convergence. The recognition of the
complementary nature of innovations demands for a new way to reward innovators in or-
der to eliminate wasteful R&D duplications and align private incentives with the socially
optimal one.
To analyze the nature of selection biases in complementary R&D projects and the role
of R&D competition as the main driver of these selection biases, we consider the following
scenario as our basic set-up. There are two complementary innovations, A and B, both of
which are needed to produce a ￿nal product. Thus, each innovation has no stand-alone value
and can generate value only when used in conjunction with the other. Further assume that
a ￿rm can engage in only one project in each period. In such a case, if there is only one ￿rm
that can engage in the R&D projects, the sequence of project choice is irrelevant since the
￿rm needs to make both innovations.2 However, sequence choice becomes important when
there is competition and the ￿rst ￿rm that innovates receives a patent on the innovation
made. We allow asymmetry in the research projects in terms of the di¢ culty of success and
show that there is a tendency for preemptive duplication in the easier project compared to
the socially optimal allocation of research project choices.
To understand the selection bias towards the easier project, consider the following nu-
2This holds true as long as there is no learning e⁄ect from successfully completing one project before
another.
2merical example. Let p and q be the success probabilities for project A and B, respectively,
where p > q, i.e., project A has a relatively higher chance of success compared to B. Each
￿rm can engage in only one project in each period. There are two periods and there is
no discounting. Let the value of the ￿nal product comprised of the two innovations be
normalized to 1. If one ￿rm has patents for both innovations, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is 1. If
one ￿rm has a patent for one innovation and the other ￿rm has a patent for the other, we
assume that they split the value and each ￿rm receives 1=2. If both ￿rms succeed in the
same innovation, we assume that each ￿rm has an equal chance of receiving the patent. To
make the intuition clear, suppose that p = 1 and q = 1=2, that is, innovation in project
A is certain. Then, it is clear that there should never be duplication in project A for the
social optimum to maximize the probability of completing both projects by the end of the
second period. However, it can be easily shown that in equilibrium both ￿rms engage in
project A in the ￿rst period.3 The intuition for this discrepancy between the private and
social incentives is that ￿rms care about the division of market value of the ￿nal product
as well as the overall probability of completing both projects by the second period. The
privately optimal strategy to maximize their share of market value is to stake an early claim
on the patent that is easily achievable because it allows them to hold up against anyone
who succeeds in the other project.
We demonstrate that the biases identi￿ed above in complementary project choices are
persistent and robust. We extend the basic set-up to allow for more than 2 ￿rms, free
entry to the R&D race, and an in￿nite horizon. In all variations of the basic model, we
￿nd that the biases towards preemptive duplication in the easier project persist. We also
analyze selection biases in complementary R&D projects that arise from asymmetry in ￿rm
capabilities. To illustrate this, consider the same example above except that ￿rm 1 is a
￿specialist￿that has the capability to innovate in only project A. More speci￿cally, assume
that p1 = 0, q1 = p2 = q2 = 2=3;where subscript i = 1;2, denotes ￿rm identity. Since ￿rm 1
can engage in only project A, the socially optimal outcome is that ￿rm 1 engages in project
A and ￿rm 2 engages in project B in the ￿rst period. In the market equilibrium, ￿rm 1
3Under the parameter assumption in this example, the equilibrium expected payo⁄ from both choosing
project A is given by 12/32. However, when one ￿rm chooses project B while the other ￿rm chooses A,
which is the socially optimal outcome, its expected payo⁄ is only 11/32(<12/32).
3engages in project A. We can show that ￿rm 2 also selects project A in the ￿rst period.4
The intuition for this result is the same. Firm 2 does not face any threat in project B and
thus engages in preemptive duplication in project A to secure the maximal market share.
Our paper departs from most of the R&D literature in two respects. First, the main
focus of the literature has been on the aggregate amount of R&D and the comparison
of equilibrium R&D spending to the socially optimal level.5 However, as pointed out by
Mans￿eld (1981), ￿the composition of R&D expenditures may be as important as their total
size (italics added, p. 614).￿The R&D management literature also emphasizes the impor-
tance of R&D project selection decisions. For instance, Ofek (2008) states that ￿one of the
most important dilemmas confronting ￿rms￿in the product development process is ￿where
should these e⁄orts be directed?￿ . Second, most of the R&D literature analyzes R&D com-
petition for a single isolated innovation. Even though this may be a good description of
many innovations in the past, it is increasingly at odds in today￿ s high-tech industries. In
our paper, we consider complementary innovations and focus on the allocation of R&D
resources across projects to re￿ ect this reality.
Early contributions that analyzed the issue of R&D resource allocations across projects
include Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), and Klette
and de Meza (1986). They consider an isolated innovation case and show that the market
is biased towards the selection of more risky projects compared to the social optimum.
The main intuition comes from the ￿winner-takes-all￿nature of patent races that gives rise
to a convex payo⁄ function for potential innovators.6 Our paper, in contrast, considers an
environment of complementary innovations and analyzes the allocation of resources between
the two projects.
In terms of the preemptive nature of R&D, our paper is closest to Cardon and Sasaki
(1998). They show that ￿rms have incentives to cluster on the same project even if poten-
tial technologies are ex ante equally promising and there are no informational spillovers.
4Firm 2￿ s expected payo⁄ from engaging in project A in the ￿rst period is given by 38/81 whereas its
expected payo⁄ from engaging in project B, which is the socially optimal outcome, is only 35/81.
5The classical contributions to this question include Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980), and Tandon (1983), among others. See Reinganum (1988) for an excellent survey of the
literature on R&D.
6Cabral (1994), in contrast, derives conditions under which the market is biased against risky R&D
portfolios in a setup where there can be more than one winner in the R&D competition. He analyzes ￿rms￿
decisions to allocate their ￿xed R&D budgets across two independent markets, one in which innovation is
easier and a larger market in which innovation is more di¢ cult. He shows that there is a bias against risky
R&D (i.e., innovation in the larger market with a lower probability of success).
4However, the mechanism for clustering in their paper is very di⁄erent from ours. In their
paper, clustering takes place in the R&D stage to delay product market competition. This
e⁄ect arises because they assume that the two potential technologies are substitutes rather
than complements as in our case. If the two ￿rms engage in di⁄erent projects, there is a
possibility that both ￿rms succeed and compete in the product market. By clustering on
the same project, there will only be one ￿rm that receives a patent and the market struc-
ture is guaranteed to be monopolistic until the ￿rm that loses out pursues and succeeds
in the other competing project. In a related paper, Gerlach et al. (2005) consider ￿rms￿
decisions of which products to target for innovation in a Hotelling model with stochastic
R&D outcomes. They analyze how project choice depends on the degree of technical risk.
As the degree of technical risk increases, i.e., innovations become harder to succeed in, there
is more clustering at the mid point of the market because the risk of facing competition
decreases. The main di⁄erence is that they consider substitute technologies as in most of
the literature whereas we are concerned with complementary innovations.7
As in our paper, Gilbert and Katz (forthcoming) consider a situation in which the in-
troduction of a new product requires complementary technologies. They derive the optimal
mechanism to split pro￿ts form complementary innovations to support e¢ cient investment
in R&D. Their model assumes a pre-determined sequence of innovation races for comple-
mentary technologies. Therefore, the issue of project choice does not arise in their model.
The main focus of their paper is on the aggregate investment level as in the traditional
R&D literature. Fershtman and Kamien (1992) also consider complementary technologies.
However, their setup and focus are quite di⁄erent from those in our paper. In their model,
only the ￿nal product that incorporates all complementary technologies is patentable and
patents for intermediate (component) technologies are not granted. Therefore, it is possible
that ￿rms continue to develop component technologies already developed by other ￿rms as
long as all component technologies necessary for the new ￿nal product have not been de-
veloped by the same ￿rm. Nevertheless, cross-licensing can take place when di⁄erent ￿rms
have developed di⁄erent component technologies. The basic trade-o⁄s in the cross-licensing
7See also Lin (2009) who considers allocation of R&D resources for multiproduct ￿rms and analyzes
how competition a⁄ects the optimal R&D portfolios. He shows that, relative to a monopoly, multiproduct
duopolists choose more specialized R&D portfolios with regard to their core products in order to avoid
head-to-head competition. Once again, he considers substitute products and the equilibrium con￿guration
is characterized by diversi￿cation, rather than duplication.
5decision are the bene￿ts of avoiding unnecessary duplication and speeding up the introduc-
tion of the new product against the costs of intensi￿ed competition in the ￿nal product
market. The focus of their paper is how the possibility of cross-licensing a⁄ects the ￿rms￿
R&D investment levels, and hence the pace of the innovation race in a model of stochastic
R&D process.8 In contrast, we consider a situation in which component technologies them-
selves are patentable and analyze how the patentability of component technologies drives
ine¢ ciency in the choice of R&D projects.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we set
up a very basic model of project selection for complementary innovations to illustrate the
incentive to preempt on the easier project, which leads to clustering and wasteful duplication
of e⁄orts from the social planner￿ s viewpoint. Section 3 considers prior user rights as
a solution to mitigate preemptive duplication. Section 4 expands on the basic model and
considers various extensions of the model to check the robustness of the main result. Section
5 analyzes selection biases in complementary R&D projects that are driven by asymmetric
￿rm capabilities rather than asymmetric projects. Section 6 closes the paper with concluding
remarks. The proofs for lemmas and propositions are relegated to Appendices A and B.
2 Model of Project Choice in Complementary Innovations
2.1 Basic Set-up
Consider two ￿rms and two complementary innovations, A and B. Both technologies are
needed for a ￿nal product.9 Alternatively, we can consider A and B as complementary com-
ponents that form a system. Let m be the monopoly pro￿t from the ￿nal product/system
good that incorporates these two innovations. Thus, if one ￿rm has patents for both inno-
vations A and B, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is given by m. With only one innovation available, there
is no intermediate payo⁄. When the patents are owned by two di⁄erent ￿rms, each patent
holder￿ s pro￿t is denoted by d. In this situation, there is typically a pricing externality due
to the complementary nature of the two innovations. We assume that the two ￿rms can
8Fershtman and Kamien (1992) also consider a scenario in which component technologies are patentable.
In that case, the race, in the absence of cross-licensing, is essentially over when one component technology
is developed because the innovator can hold-up. The analysis in this case thus is more or less trivial since
their focus is on the role of cross-licensing in the R&D race.
9In section 4, we extend our analysis to N ￿rms and show that the main result is robust to this change.
6internalize the externality and coordinate on pricing. This assumption is justi￿ed because
price coordination reduces the overall price of the two innovations and thus bene￿ts con-
sumers; there is no reason for an antitrust authority to intervene. We further suppose that
the two ￿rms split the industry pro￿t through Nash bargaining, which implies that d = m=2.
This is a natural assumption to make in the context of complementary innovations where
each innovator has the ability to hold up the marketing of the ￿nal product.
We consider a two-period model in which each ￿rm independently decides which project
to carry out in each period.10 There is no discounting. The industry pro￿t m can be
realized only when both innovations have been made by the end of the second period. Even
though the two innovations are both necessary to generate any surplus, the two projects
are asymmetric in terms of success probability.11 More speci￿cally, we assume that the
probability of success for projects A and B in each period are respectively given by p and
q, where 0 < p;q < 1 and p > q, that is, technology A is relatively easier to achieve. When
a ￿rm succeeds in an innovation, the ￿rm gets a patent on the innovation. If both ￿rms
are successful in the same innovation in the same period, we assume that each ￿rm gets the
patent with a probability of 1
2.12 13
The main focus of the paper is the composition of the R&D project portfolios rather
than the level of R&D investments. We thus assume away the cost of R&D, and instead
suppose that each ￿rm can engage in only one R&D project in each period. One way to
justify this assumption is that each ￿rm has a ￿xed R&D budget or limited R&D personnel,
which does not allow implementation of simultaneous R&D projects in the same period.14
When both projects are successfully carried out and the ￿nal product or system good
is introduced in the market, social welfare is given by w.15 In this framework, it is easy
to verify that under monopoly there is no discrepancy between the private choice and the
10In section 4, we extend our analysis to an in￿nite horizon model and show that the main result is robust
to changes in the time horizon.
11In section 5, we extend our analysis to the case where markets are symmetric but ￿rms di⁄er in their
research capabilities.
12The event of simultaneous discovery arises due to the discrete time framework we use. In a continuous
time framework with a Poisson distribution of a successful innovation, the probability of simultaneous
innovation is a measure zero event and the probability of each ￿rm winning is 1/2.
13In the next section we consider the prior user rights policy which grants patents to all innovators when
￿rms innovate at the same time.
14In section 4, we consider the possibility of costly entry into the R&D stage and derive the same qualitative
results.
15Note that the social surplus is the same regardless of the number of ￿rms that hold patents because we
assume that price coordination takes place if patents are held by two di⁄erent ￿rms.
7socially optimal choice. In fact, in both cases the sequence of project choices does not
matter. With two periods, private bene￿ts and social surplus can be realized only when
an innovation is made in each period, and the probability of such an event is given by pq
regardless of the sequence. This implies that if there is any discrepancy between the market
equilibrium and the socially optimal outcome in our setup, it can be attributed only to the
rivalry in R&D competition.
Finally, the following notation is helpful for exposition throughout the paper. Suppose
in period 1 exactly one patent is awarded. This occurs if (i) both ￿rms pursue the same
technology and at least one is successful, or if (ii) they choose di⁄erent projects and ex-
actly one ￿rm is successful. Further assume that the success probability for the remaining
technology is x for the patentholder and y for the unsuccessful ￿rm.16 Let ￿1(x;y) denote








This market share takes values between 1/2 and 1. It strictly increases in the patentholder￿ s
capability x. The e⁄ect of an increase in the rival￿ s capability is ambiguous due to the
complementarity of the technologies. A higher y reduces the patentholder￿ s expected market
share when this ￿rm is successful in period 2. By contrast, a more capable rival is bene￿cial
in the event that the patentholder is not successful in period 2. In this case a higher y
increases the probability that both technologies are available at the end of period 2 (and
that the ￿rm￿ s patent from period 1 becomes valuable). The negative e⁄ect of a strong rival
increases in x, whereas the positive e⁄ect decreases in x. Verify that if the patentholder￿ s
capability is less than 2/3, then the ￿rm bene￿ts from a stronger rival with @￿1(x;y)=@ > 0.
Otherwise, we have @￿1(x;y)=@y < 0: Similarly, let ￿0(x;y) denote the overall expected








This value increases in the ￿rm￿ s own capability x, decreases in its rival￿ s success rate
and is between 0 and 1/2. Note that these market shares are de￿ned conditional on both
16We allow di⁄erent success probabilities for the same project because we consider asymmetric ￿rm capa-
bilities in section 5.
8technologies being available by the end of the second period. Hence, the sum of the market
shares ￿0(x;y)+￿1(y;x) is the probability that at least one of the ￿rms is successful in the
second period.
2.2 Social Optimum
As a benchmark we ￿rst derive the second best social optimum for project choice, given the
pricing decisions and the patent system. We show that the socially optimal project choice
is for each ￿rm to diversify, i.e., for one ￿rm to pursue project A and the other to pursue
project B to eliminate duplication of R&D output in the ￿rst period.
We proceed by backward induction. Consider the e¢ cient project choices in the second
period. If there is no innovation in the ￿rst period, it is clear that the social optimum is
for each ￿rm to diversify. If both ￿rms engage in the same project, the expected social
surplus is zero because both innovations are needed due to the complementary nature of
the innovations. If there is only one innovation in the ￿rst period, the optimum is for both
￿rms to engage in the remaining innovation project.
Now consider the ￿rst period project choices. Let the expected social surplus when both
￿rms engage in project i 2 fA;Bg in the ￿rst period be denoted by W(i;i). Assume x is
the success probability of technology i whereas y is the success rate of technology j. We get
W(i;i) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ x)2)[￿1(y;y) + ￿0(y;y)]w + (1 ￿ x)2xyw:
If at least one ￿rm is successful in i, both ￿rms dedicate themselves to technology j where
the joint probability of success is ￿1(y;y)+￿0(y;y) = 1￿(1￿y)2: Otherwise, they diversify
in period 2. Similarly, let W(i;j) denote the expected social surplus when ￿rms choose
di⁄erent projects j 6= i. We get
W(i;j) = pqw + (1 ￿ p)q[￿1(p;p) + ￿0(p;p)]w+
(1 ￿ q)p[￿1(q;q) + ￿0(q;q)]w + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)pqw
A social planner chooses the project allocation that maximizes the probability of completing
both projects by the end of period 2. Comparing diversi￿cation and clustering in period
9one yields
W(i;j) ￿ W(i;i) = pq[1 ￿ ￿1(y;y) ￿ ￿0(y;y)]w > 0
and we get the following welfare benchmark.
Lemma 1 The socially optimal project choice in the ￿rst period is to have diversi￿cation
in the project choices across ￿rms.
When ￿rms engage in di⁄erent projects in period 1, both innovations are completed in the
event that each ￿rm￿ s research project is successful. By contrast, when ￿rm pursue the
same technology, only one innovation is completed in period 1 and there is a technical risk
that the remaining technology is not achieved by the end of period 2. In other words,
diversi￿cation avoids R&D duplication which is purely wasteful from the social planner￿ s
viewpoint. Note that this holds for any 0 < p;q < 1:
2.3 Market Equilibrium
We can easily verify that in the second period, the social optimum and the market equilib-
rium coincide. However, in the following we show that in the ￿rst period situations arise
where both ￿rms cluster on the same project whereas the social optimum dictates that each
￿rm engages in di⁄erent projects.
As a ￿rst step, suppose ￿rm 1 is research active in both periods while ￿rm 2 is only
active in the second period. If ￿rm 1 is successful with its research in the ￿rst period, then
both ￿rms engage in the remaining project. If ￿rm 1 is not successful, then each ￿rm tackles
a di⁄erent technology and expects pro￿ts of pqm=2. Firm 1 as the only research active ￿rm
in period 1 prefers project A over B if and only if
p￿1(q;q) + (1 ￿ p)pq
1
2








Obtaining a technology B patent in period 1 is more valuable since it is more likely that
at least one of the two ￿rms develops technology A in the second period. At the same
time technology B is harder to develop. However, we can easily verify that this trade-o⁄
is umbiguously resolved towards ￿rm 1 choosing project A. To see the economic intuition
behind this result, note that both options yield the same probability of completing both
10projects by the end of period 2.17 Hence, ￿rm 1 picks the one that maximizes its total
expected market share in the system. Since each ￿rm expects to secure half of the patents
obtained in the second period, the pro￿t maximizing choice for ￿rm 1 in the ￿rst period is
to engage in the technology that is easier to develop. In other words, ￿rm 1 uses its ￿rst
mover advantage to preempt its rival by securing the patent that is easier to obtain.
Now consider the case where both ￿rms are active in both periods. Let us denote ￿(i;j)
to represent a ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts when the ￿rm engages in project i and the other ￿rm
engages in project j in the ￿rst period, where i;j 2 fA;Bg. First, suppose ￿rms choose the
same project i which has a success probability x whereas the other project succeeds with
probability y. Then, we have
￿(i;i) = x21
2




With probability x2 both ￿rms succeed in the ￿rst period, in which case each ￿rm gets
a patent on the ￿rst innovation with probability 1/2. In the second period, both ￿rms
engage in R&D for the second innovation. With probability x(1 ￿ x) one ￿rm is successful
in period 1 while the other one is not. As patentholder the ￿rm gets ￿1(y;y) in the second
innovation; if unsuccessful, it gets ￿0(y;y): If both ￿rms are unsuccessful in the ￿rst period,
they diversify in the second period and with probability xy each receives half of the market
value.
Similarly, suppose ￿rms choose di⁄erent projects. One ￿rm chooses project i with success
rate x whereas its rival engages in technology j with success rate y. Then the expected








With probability xy both ￿rms are successful and each holds a patent for one of the two
technologies. With probability x(1￿y) only the ￿rm in project i was successful and receives
a patent. Both ￿rms then engage in the research of project j. Conversely, with probability
y(1 ￿ x) only the rival succeeds and ￿rms continue with technology i.
17If ￿rm 1 chooses project A in the ￿rst period, the probability of completing both projects by the end of
period is given by p[1￿(1￿q)
2]+(1￿p)pq. The corresponding probability when ￿rm 1 chooses project B
in the ￿rst period is given by q[1￿(1￿p)
2]+(1￿q)pq. A simple manipulation shows that both expressions
are equal to pq(3 ￿ p ￿ q).
11Let us turn to the equilibrium analysis. First, suppose ￿rm 2 chooses project A. Firm
1 prefers to cluster and choose the same project if and only if ￿(A;A) ￿ ￿(B;A) or
(1 ￿ p)[p￿1(q;q) ￿ q￿1(p;p) ￿ (p ￿ q)pq
1
2
] + p(p ￿ q)
1
2




[1 ￿ ￿1(q;q) ￿ ￿0(q;q)]:
This incentive constraint describes the basic trade-o⁄ for ￿rms between preemptive cluster-
ing and gains from diversi￿cation. The LHS is the net bene￿t from clustering in the easier
technology in order to preemptively secure a patent in the ￿rst period. The ￿rst term is
the expected gain from preemption when the rival ￿rm in A is unsuccessful. In particular,
the expression in the squared bracket is identical to the net bene￿t from clustering when
the rival is not active in period one. As discussed in (1), this term is always positive. The
second term on the LHS is the gain from clustering when the rival is successful. With
probability mass p-q ￿rm 1 is successful when joining market A but not when pursuing
B. In market A each ￿rm obtains the patent with probability 1/2. In the latter case rival
￿rm 2 always obtains the patent. The di⁄erence is half of the value of the second squared
bracket on the LHS. The RHS is the expected gain from diversi￿cation when both ￿rms￿
projects are successful. Choosing di⁄erent projects avoids duplication of R&D and enables
the ￿rms to complete both innovations at the end of period 1. By contrast, clustering yields
one successful innovation in period 1 and the technical risk as to whether both projects are
accomplished by the end of period 2. To quantitify the trade-o⁄ between preemption and




(3 ￿ p ￿ q) ￿
1
2
(1 ￿ q)2: (2￿ )
For p=q the LHS of (2) is equal to zero whereas the gains from avoiding duplication are
positive. By contrast, if p=1, then the preemption incentive dominates diversi￿cation and
￿rm 1 always clusters.18 Finally, it can be veri￿ed that (2) holds if and only if p ￿ p￿ where
p￿ is the smaller root of the solution to (2￿ ) as an equality.19
18In this case the incentive constraint reduces to 1=2 ￿ q=4 ￿ 1=2 ￿ q=2:
19Rewrite (2￿ ) as equality, i.e. (1￿p
￿)p
￿ +(1￿q)q ￿2(1￿p
￿) = 0, and check that the di⁄erence between
LHS and RHS is concave in q and has a strictly positive derivative 3 ￿ 2p for all p in [0;1]. The threshold
is thus given by
p
￿ = 3=2 ￿
p
1=4 + q(1 ￿ q):
12Alternatively, suppose one ￿rm chooses project B. The rival ￿rm prefers project A if
and only if ￿(A;B) ￿ ￿(B;B) or
(1 ￿ q)[p￿1(q;q) ￿ q￿1(p;p) ￿ (p ￿ q)pq
1
2






[1 ￿ ￿1(p;p) ￿ ￿0(p;p)] ￿ 0:
Verify that this condition always holds. The ￿rst term is the expected gain from preemption
when the rival in B is not innovating. By condition (1) the ￿rst squared bracket is strictly
positive. The second term is the expected preemption bene￿t when the rival is successful.
With probability mass p-q ￿rm 1 is successful in market A but not in B. In this case, the
relative market share advantage from being in market A is the term in the second squared
bracket. The last term is the bene￿t from avoiding R&D duplication when both innovate.
Thus, when one ￿rm opts for market B, its rival is always better o⁄ choosing technology A.
From this analysis two equilibrium regimes follow. If (2) is satis￿ed, then the unique
equilibrium is (A,A), i.e. both ￿rms engage in project A in the ￿rst period, causing inef-
￿ciency in the project choice. Otherwise, the equilibrium involves ￿rms choosing di⁄erent
projects, either ￿rm 1 in A and ￿rm 2 in B or vice versa, i.e. (A,B) or (B,A).20 This is
illustrated in Figure 1 below. It is instructive to pinpoint circumstances under which there
is ine¢ cient clustering on the technology that is easier to implement. When both projects
are relatively di¢ cult, that is, both p and q are small (with the maintained assumption of
p > q), there is diversi￿cation of project selection. As discussed above, preemption is only
pro￿table if project A has a su¢ ciently high success rate to overcome the gains from R&D
diversi￿cation. By contrast, preemption incentives are non-monotonic in the success rate
of project B. Preemption is most likely to occur if q is intermediate. First, if q is high and
su¢ ciently close to p, then the relative gain from preemption is small. Second, preemp-
tive patenting in technology A is only valuable if there is an innovation in technology B in
period 2. Hence, for low values of q, there is a countervailing incentive against clustering
to maximize the overall probability that both innovations are made. As a consequence,
20We assume that the two ￿rms can coordinate on one of the two pure strategy equilibria. There
is also a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which both ￿rms choose project A with probability
￿(A;B)￿￿(B;B)
[￿(A;B)+￿(B;A)]￿[￿(A;A)+￿(B;B)] : In the mixed strategy equilibrium, there can also be ine¢ cient duplication
when both ￿rms choose the same project A or B due to a coordination failure.
13Figure 1: Project choice equilibrium with asymmetric markets
preemption is most pro￿table for su¢ ciently high values of p and intermediate values of q.
We summarize as follows.
Proposition 1 For complementary innovations with asymmetric success probabilities, the
equilibrium project choices may be biased towards the easier technology.
Note that the market equilibrium and the socially optimal outcome coincide if we consider
a static model in which the ￿rms have only one opportunity to engage in R&D, because
the only way they can collectively bring the ￿nal product to the market is to be successful
in both innovations due to the complementary nature of the innovations. This indicates
that the source of ine¢ ciency in the simple model arises solely due to the dynamics of
competition.21
3 Prior User Rights as a Solution to Preemptive Duplication
In a recent paper, Shapiro (2006) asks the question of how property rights should be de￿ned
and allocated when innovations are made independently and at roughly the same time by
more than one individual or ￿rm. This is a pertinent question in our setup where duplicative
21In section 4 we analyze the case where the number of ￿rms is larger than the number of complementary
projects and show that this can lead to ine¢ ciencies in the static case, too.
14research e⁄orts lead to a possibility of simultaneous discovery. In consistency with the
current patent system, we have assumed that each ￿rm has an equal chance of receiving
the patent and obtaining exclusive property rights on the innovation. Shapiro assumes that
both ￿rms have the right to use the invention with prior user rights. In other words, he
abstracts from the details of which party discovered the invention ￿rst, and treats prior
user rights as an independent invention defense. Slight di⁄erence in invention timing are
considered random. With such an abstraction, Shapiro analyzes the e⁄ects of prior user
rights on R&D resource allocations and explores their welfare implications in the context of
a single isolated innovation. In the following we consider the e⁄ects of prior user rights in
the context of complementary innovations and show that prior user rights have a salutatory
e⁄ect of mitigating duplicative research project choice.22 Thus, the positive e⁄ects of prior
user rights extend beyond the ones identi￿ed in Shapiro (2006).
To analyze the prior user rights policy, we need to consider two additional market
structures at the end of period 2, which could not arise in the set-up of section 2. First,
suppose one ￿rm holds patents for both technologies whereas its rival holds exactly one
patent. In this case, we suppose that the dominant ￿rm with two patents is able to extract
the monopoly rent from the system and earn pro￿ts of m. Second, when both ￿rms end
up holding patents for both technologies, the monopolistic rent is entirely competed away.
From this we can construct the expected conditional market shares when exactly one ￿rm
receives a patent in period 1. The expected market share of a ￿rm holding one patent while
its rival was not successful is given by




Conversely, a ￿rm without patent after period 1 who faces a rival with exactly one patent
expects a total market share of




22Maurer and Scotchmer (2003) make a similar point in a static model with determistic R&D outcomes.
15Notice that
b ￿1(x;y) > ￿1(x;y);b ￿0(x;y) < ￿0(x;y); and b ￿1(x;y) + b ￿0(x;y) = ￿1(x;y) + ￿0(x;y)
Compared to the standard patent system, a patent holder from period 1 has a higher
expected overall market share whereas the unsuccessful ￿rm￿ s expected market share is
lower. This is due to the fact that with prior user rights the patentholder obtains a market
share of one if he innovates in the second period independent of the success of its rival.23
Next consider ex ante pro￿ts as function of project choices. Suppose both ￿rms choose
project i with success probability x in the ￿rst period. The expected pro￿ts from clustering
with prior user rights are
b ￿(i;i) ￿ ￿(i;i) ￿ x2y21
2
m:
The only di⁄erence to the standard patent system arises if both ￿rms succeed and receive
user rights in the ￿rst period. In this case a ￿rm only makes positive pro￿ts at the end
of period 2 if it is the sole innovator of the remaining technology. Hence, relative to the
standard patent system, prior user rights reduce the value of clustering. Similarly, consider
the expected pro￿ts of a ￿rm pursuing project i (with success rate x) whereas the other
￿rm engages in project j in the ￿rst period,
b ￿(i;j) ￿ ￿(i;j) + x(1 ￿ y)[b ￿1(y;y) ￿ ￿1(y;y)]m + (1 ￿ x)y[b ￿0(x;x) ￿ ￿0(x;x)]m:
Here the di⁄erence to the standard patent system arises when one ￿rm is successful in
period 1 while the other one is not. As mentioned above, the successful ￿rm gains whereas
the unsuccessful ￿rm loses relative to a standard patent system. The overall e⁄ect is thus
ambiguous.
Before deriving the incentive constraint for clustering, consider the project choice in the
case where ￿rm 1 is active in both periods whereas ￿rm 2 is only active in period 2. In this
setting prior user rights remove the preemption incentive of the standard patent system and
23Note that at the same time, the probability that at least one ￿rm is successful, b ￿0(x;y) + b ￿1(y;x); is
the same as in the previous section.
16￿rm 1 is indi⁄erent as to which project to choose in period 1, i.e.
pb ￿1(q;q) + (1 ￿ p)pq
1
2




To see this, consider the two pathways that lead to the completion of both innovations and
verify that ￿rm 1 is indi⁄erent between the two projects in both cases. If ￿rm 1 is successful
in both periods, it will have a market share of one, independent of ￿rm 2￿ s R&D outcome.
Hence, the initial project choice is irrelevant. If ￿rm 1 succeeds exactly once and ￿rm 2
succeeds in period 2, then ￿rm 1￿ s market share is 1/2 and both projects have the same
overall probability of completing the two technologies.
Given that there is no preemption incentive when the rival is not successful, we can




￿ q(1 ￿ q)] ￿ (p ￿ q)p[q(1 ￿ q) ￿ b ￿0(q;q)] (5)
The LHS is the gain from diversi￿cation when both ￿rms are successful. The RHS is the
preemption gain from raising the success probability by pursuing A instead of B given that
the rival is successful. With probability mass p ￿ q the ￿rm is successful in A and jointly
awarded a patent whereas it would not innovate in B. Note that the RHS is strictly smaller
than the second term in (2) and the LHS is strictly larger than the RHS in (2). Thus,
prior user rights reduce preemption incentives and increase the loss from R&D duplication.
Simplifying (5) further yields
1 ￿ 2q(1 ￿ q) ￿ (p ￿ q)(1 ￿ q) (5￿ )
which, by inspection, is always satis￿ed.24 Hence, an equilibrium, in which both ￿rms
choose technology A in the ￿rst period, does not exist. Furthermore, consider a situation
where ￿rm 1 chooses technology A and ￿rm 2 technology B. Firm 2 always gains more from
preemption by deviating to A than ￿rm 1 from deviating to B. From this and (5) follows that,
with prior user rights, the unique (modulo symmetry) pure strategy equilibrium involves
24The RHS is maximized at p=1. For this value the condition simpli￿es to
1 ￿ 2q + 2q
2 ￿ 1 ￿ 2q + q
2:
17the two ￿rms choosing di⁄erent research projects. Prior user rights increase the gains from
diversi￿cation and reduce the bene￿ts from preemption. As a result, the bias towards joint
discovery due to preemptive duplication incentives can be mitigated.
Proposition 2 In the only pure strategy equilibrium with prior user rights the two ￿rms
choose di⁄erent research projects. Hence, the market equilibrium is e¢ cient with prior user
rights.
4 Extensions and the Robustness of the Basic Model
In this section, we extend the basic model in several dimensions and illustrate that the
main result of the paper ￿preemptive duplication in the easier project for complementary
innovations ￿is robust to changes in the basic model.
4.1 N Firm Model
We ￿rst extend our model to consider a more general N ￿rm case. Suppose that there are
N (>2) ￿rms that can engage in the two R&D projects. We implicitly assume barriers to
entry, and the number of ￿rms is ￿xed at N.25 Apart from this we follow the assumptions
of the model in section 2. In particular, each ￿rm can engage in only one project and R&D
outcomes are independent across ￿rms and projects. Let nA and nB denote the number
of ￿rms that engage in R&D projects A and B, respectively, with nA + nB = N. The
probability that all ￿rms fail in project A is given by (1 ￿ p)nA: Let P(nA) denote the
probability that at least one ￿rm is successful in project A when nA ￿rms invest in project
A. Then, we have P(nA) = 1￿ (1 ￿ p)nA: Similarly, we can denote the probability that at
least one ￿rm succeeds in project B as Q(nB) = 1￿ (1 ￿ q)nB:
4.1.1 Static Model as a Building Block
In this set-up, the main e¢ ciency question is how many ￿rms will engage in each project
and how the market equilibrium con￿guration compares to the socially optimal outcome.
To address this issue, we ￿rst analyze the static case in which each ￿rm has only one chance
to engage in R&D. In the simple model we analyze in section 2, there is no ine¢ ciency in
25We consider the free entry case below and show that the conclusions are robust.
18the static framework since two ￿rms are always better o⁄ diversifying. We now show that
this result does not carry over to situations with more than two ￿rms.
To see this, note that the social planner maximizes the probability that both innovations
are made, given the total number of ￿rms N. In other words, the social planner solves
Max
nA;nB
W ￿ P(nA)Q(nB) = [1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA][1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)nB]
subject to nA + nB = N
For the simplicity of the analysis, we treat n as a continuous variable. The ￿rst order







The optimal allocation of ￿rms equates the marginal gain in the system success rate across
the two projects. The next lemma characterizes the socially optimal allocation of ￿rms.
Lemma 2 Let no
A and no
B be the socially optimal division of projects among N ￿rms in the
static problem, where no
A +no
B = N: Then, it holds that no
A < no
B: Furthermore, the socially
optimal number of ￿rms in project A decreases in p and increases in q.
Lemma 2 states that the socially optimal division of ￿rms across projects requires more
resources to be devoted to the more di¢ cult project. This result can also be interpreted as
the optimal resource allocation for a monopolist with a ￿xed research budget. For instance,
consider a monopolistic ￿rm with N research teams that can be assigned to one of the two
projects. The optimal solution to this problem is isomorphic to the social planner￿ s problem
in that both problems maximize the probability that each one of both innovations is made
by at least one team. The monopolist will devote more resources to the more di¢ cult
project.
In the market equilibrium, the expected bene￿ts of participating in each project should
be equalized. Otherwise, a ￿rm in the less pro￿table project has an incentive to switch to
the other project. The equilibrium numbers of participants, n￿
A and n￿








19In other words, a ￿rm￿ s average contribution to system success has to be equal in both
projects. This, of course, requires that the number of ￿rms in each project is identical,
i.e. n￿
A = n￿
B. Since the total number of participating ￿rms is ￿xed and the social planner
prefers to devote more ￿rms to the more di¢ culty project, we get the following result.
Proposition 3 In the static problem with N>2 ￿rms participating in the R&D projects,
too many ￿rms engage in the easy project compared to the socially optimal con￿guration.
Note that the market equilibrium con￿guration is independent of p and q whereas the so-
cially optimal con￿guration is sensitive to the relative magnitude of the success probabilities.
Suppose we are in a symmetric situation in which p = q. Then, the socially optimal out-




B = N=2: From Lemma
2 follows that as we move further away from this situation, the discrepancy between the
two outcomes becomes magni￿ed since the market equilibrium is invariant to changes in the
success probabilities. In other words, as the more di¢ cult project becomes harder, or the
less di¢ cult project becomes easier, there is more excessive clustering in the easier project.
4.1.2 Dynamic Model with N ￿rms
Now consider a two period model of innovations like in Section 2. Each ￿rm can engage
in only one project in a given period, but each ￿rm has two chances. We show that in
this dynamic setting, the excessive clustering problem worsens relative to the static model
analyzed above.
In the second period, there are four possible scenarios. If both innovations were made in
the ￿rst period, the system can be marketed and then the game ends. If only one innovation
A (B) was made in the ￿rst period, then the market equilibrium and the socially optimal
outcome are the same; all ￿rms engage in the remaining project B (A). If neither innovation
was made in the ￿rst period, the second period problem is the same as the static problem
from section 4.1.1.
Our focus is therefore the ￿rst period decision problem for each ￿rm and the social
planner. First, consider the social planner￿ s problem, which is to maximize the probability
of making both innovations by the end of the second period. Let ￿o be the probability that
both innovations will be made when N ￿rms are allocated optimally in the static problem,
20i.e. ￿o ￿ P(no
A)Q(no
B). Then the social planner￿ s problem is
Max
nA;nB
c W ￿ P(nA)Q(nB) + P(nA)[1 ￿ Q(nB)]Q(N)
+[1 ￿ P(nA)]Q(nB)P(N) + [1 ￿ P(nA)][1 ￿ Q(nB)]￿o
subject to nA + nB = N
The solution to this problem implies that the marginal value of increasing the number of
￿rms in each project is equal, i.e.
@P(nA)
@nA
[Q(nB) + [1 ￿ Q(nB)]Q(N) ￿ Q(nB)P(N) ￿ [1 ￿ Q(nB)]￿o] =
@Q(nB)
@nB
[P(nA) + [1 ￿ P(nA)]P(N) ￿ P(nA)Q(N) ￿ [1 ￿ P(nA)]￿o]:
From this the socially optimal allocation can be characterized as follows.
Lemma 3 Let b no
A and b no
B be the socially optimal division of projects among N ￿rms in the
￿rst period of the dynamic model where b no
A + b no
B = N: Then, it holds that b no
A < no
A < N=2:
Compared to the e¢ cient solution in the static setting, the social planner allocates relatively
more ￿rms to pursue the more di¢ cult project B in the ￿rst period of the dynamic problem.
The reason for this is that the social opportunity cost of adding a ￿rm to the harder project
is higher in the static setting relative to the ￿rst period of the dynamic problem. Thus,
when ￿rms are unsuccessful in the ￿rst period of the dynamic model, the social planner
optimally re-allocates some ￿rms from the harder to the easier project.
Let us turn to the market equilibrium in the ￿rst period. Given the market equilibrium
con￿guration in the second period, de￿ne ￿A(nA;nB) and ￿B(nA;nB) to be each ￿rm￿ s
expected pro￿ts of entering into project A and B, respectively, when there are nA and
nB ￿rms for each project. Let ￿￿ be the probability that both innovations will be made
when N ￿rms are allocated according to the market equilibrium in the static problem, i.e.
￿￿ ￿ P(n￿
A)Q(n￿









































In a market equilibrium no ￿rm should have an incentive to switch to the other project, i.e.
it has to hold that ￿A(nA;nB) = ￿B(nA;nB). The next lemma characterizes the project
choice equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Lemma 4 Let b n￿
A and b n￿
B be the allocation of ￿rms to projects in the equilibrium of the
￿rst period of the dynamic model where b n￿
A + b n￿
B = N: Then, it holds that b n￿
A > N=2:
In the equilibrium of the dynamic model with N ￿rms, preemption incentives induce more
￿rms to engage in the easier project A than in project B. By contrast, we know from Lemma
3 that a social planner would allocate a majority of ￿rms to the harder project B. Hence, we
obtain the same selection bias towards the easier project as in section 2. Our results actually
allow us to characterize this bias further. Notice that in the static problem of section 4.1.1
the selection bias is given by n￿
A ￿ no
A > 0. Since b no
A < no
A and b n￿
A > n￿
A = N=2, the
outcomes of the static and dynamic model can be ranked as follows,
b n￿




Thus, compared to the static selection model, there will be an additional preemptive incen-
tive to concentrate on the easier project in a dynamic model. Or, put di⁄erently, a selection
bias occurs in each stage of the dynamic R&D selection model.
Proposition 4 In the dynamic R&D project selection model with N>2 ￿rms, too many
￿rms engage in the easier project. A selection bias towards the easier project occurs in each
stage of the dynamic model.
4.2 R&D Costs and Free Entry
4.2.1 R&D Selection Model with Endogenous Entry
So far, we have assumed that there is no cost of R&D with a ￿xed number of ￿rms who are
capable of engaging in R&D. In this subsection, we demonstrate that the main intuition
22holds even as we introduce free entry with R&D costs. To this end, consider a simple
extension of the model with N>2 ￿rms, in which each ￿rm can engage in one of the two
projects at a cost of c. We further make the assumption that the private value and the social
value of completing both innovations are the same (m = w). This allows us to eliminate
the source of ine¢ ciency that arises from the discrepancy between market and social value;
any ine¢ ciency in this setup is due to the competition e⁄ect.
In the market equilibrium of the static model, there will be entry until the expected
bene￿ts of participating will be equal to the cost of entry c for both projects. This implies















The socially optimal number of entrants in each project solves
Max
nA;nB
P(nA)Q(nB)m ￿ cnA ￿ cnB
and the socially optimal number of entrants (no
A;no






m = c. (7)
By comparing the market equilibrium condition (6) to the social optimality condition (7),
we can identify two sources for ine¢ ciencies. First, as is the case with the commons problem,
the free entry equilibrium associates the number of entrants with the average bene￿t whereas
the socially optimal outcome is concerned with the marginal bene￿t of an additional entrant.
Since the probability of at least one success for each project is a concave function of the
number of participants, the average pro￿t exceeds the marginal pro￿t, leading to excessive
entry. This is consistent to Tandon (1983) who shows that there is excessive entry for the
case of isolated innovations because the average bene￿t exceeds the marginal bene￿t of
the marginal entrant. However, with complementary innovations, there is a countervailing
e⁄ect. More precisely, with complementary innovations, an additional entrant in one project
confers positive externalities on the other innovation, which is ignored in the private entry
decision. This non-internalization of the positive externality is re￿ ected by the factor m=2
(rather than m) in the condition for the market equilibrium. This positive externality e⁄ect
23induces the extent of market entry to be insu¢ cient compared to the social optimum. Due
to the coexistence of these two con￿ icting e⁄ects, we do not have an unambiguous result
on the extent of market entry compared to the socially optimal entry level. The extent of
entry in the market equilibrium can be either excessive or insu¢ cient.
In addition, we derive another source of ine¢ ciency with complementary R&D projects.
Given the total number of ￿rms that engage in R&D, too many ￿rms choose project A
compared to the socially optimal division between projects A and B. As shown above, the
number of entrants in each project will be the same in the market equilibrium. The social
optimum, however, requires that more ￿rms to engage in the more di¢ cult project B.
Proposition 5 With free entry into R&D project participation, there are two sources of
ine¢ ciency. First, there is excessive or insu¢ cient entry in that the total number of ￿rms
participating in the project exceeds or falls short of the socially optimal number of partici-
pants. Second, given the total number of ￿rms participating in the R&D projects, too many
￿rms engage in the easy project compared to the socially optimal con￿guration.
Conceptually, the analysis of the overall extent of entry in the static model with com-
plementary innovations can be easily extended to a dynamic setting. However, the full
characterizations of the extent of entry in the market equilibrium and the socially optimal
outcome are tedious, and do not yield sharp predictions about the relationship between
them due to the two countervailing e⁄ects identi￿ed above. Nevertheless, given the aggre-
gate number of entrants in the ￿rst period, we can apply the same logic developed earlier
and conclude that there are too many ￿rms engaged in the easy project.
4.2.2 Intermediate Licensing
With free entry, we brie￿ y remark on the role of the intermediate stage licensing as a mech-
anism to encourage R&D for complementary innovations. More precisely, we consider an
intermediate stage in which only one innovation has been made and analyze the patent
holder￿ s incentive to o⁄er its innovation at a ￿xed price before investments for comple-
mentary innovations are made. Such intermediate licensing can serve as a commitment
mechanism not to hold up against complementary innovations. To understand this, let us
consider a subgame in which a ￿rm has a patent on one innovation. Let x be the prob-
ability of success for the remaining innovation. Let P(n;x) be the probability of success
24that at least one ￿rm is successful in the remaining project, that is, P(n;x) = 1￿(1￿x)n.
Suppose that the patent holder can o⁄er its innovation at any price ￿m, where ￿ 2 [0;1=2].
Then, the pro￿t to any ￿rm who receives the remaining patent is given by (1￿￿)m. Thus,
given the intermediate licensing price of ￿m, the number of ￿rms that participate in the
remaining R&D project is implicitly de￿ned by
P(n;x)
n
(1 ￿ ￿)m = c (8)
Let n￿(￿;x) be the number of entrants that satis￿es the relationship above. It can be easily
veri￿ed that n￿(￿;x) is deceasing in ￿ and increasing in x. For the moment, let us ignore
the constraint ￿ 2 [0;1=2] and assume that the patent holder can choose any ￿. Then, the











which implicitly de￿nes the optimal choice ￿￿(x): By totally di⁄erentiating the ￿rst order
condition, we can easily verify that ￿￿ is an increasing function of x, that is, the patent holder
would like to charge a higher intermediate licensing fee when the complementary innovation
is easier. This implies that there is a critical x￿ where ￿￿(x￿) = 1=2. Note that the patent
holder cannot charge more than 1=2 since the innovator of the complementary innovation
would also have an ability to hold up. We can conclude that the optimal licensing contract
is given by min[￿￿;1=2]. In other words, when x ￿ x￿, there is no role for intermediate
licensing. However, if the complementary innovation is su¢ ciently hard, that is, x < x￿, the
patent holder has an incentive to commit to receive less than half of the monopoly pro￿t
to encourage entry into the remaining R&D project. For instance, the need to encourage
complementary innovations may explain IBM￿ s recent pledge to grant free access to its
patents.26 It is straightforward to show that such intermediate licensing contracts maximize
26See Lohr (2005). See also Green and Scotchmer (2005) and Bessen and Maskin (2009) who analyze a
similar issue in the context of sequential innovations.
25ex post social welfare and thus are ex post optimal.27 However, more importantly, the
possibility of intermediate licensing can increase the ex ante expected pro￿ts from choosing
the easier project in the ￿rst place and exacerbate the incentive problem of clustering
towards the easier project.
4.3 In￿nite Horizon Model
We now return to the simple model of two ￿rms and two complementary projects, but we
extend the model to an in￿nite horizon to eliminate the end game e⁄ect of a ￿nite horizon,
which forces the two ￿rms to pursue di⁄erent projects in the ￿nal period if neither ￿rm
has made any innovation by that time. In an in￿nite horizon model both innovations are
eventually made. Since the issue is the timing of innovations with earlier innovations being
preferred, we introduce a discount factor, which is denoted by ￿(< 1).
As in the case of the two-period model, we ￿rst show that the socially optimal project
choice is for each ￿rm to diversify. To see this, suppose one innovation has been made
by any ￿rm and both ￿rms subsequently pursue the other project until one of the ￿rms
is successful. The game ends when both innovations are made, at which point the ￿nal
product can be brought to the market and the social value m obtains. The social welfare




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ x)2 :
Let W(i;j), denote the expected social surplus when no innovation has been made with ￿rm
1 choosing project i and ￿rm 2 choosing project j: Suppose project i has success probability
x whereas project j succeeds with probability y. If both ￿rms pursue project i; then welfare
W(i;i) is recursively given by
W(i;i) = ￿[1 ￿ (1 ￿ x)2]w(y)m + ￿(1 ￿ x)2W(i;i)
27To see this, notice that the patent holder￿ s problem can be restated as follows. Using (8) and treating
















W(A;A) = W(B;B) = w(p)w(q)m:
If ￿rms pursue di⁄erent projects, expected welfare is de￿ned by
W(i;j) = xym + ￿x(1 ￿ y)w(y)m + ￿(1 ￿ x)yw(x) + ￿(1 ￿ x)(1 ￿ y)W(i;j);
which yields
W(A;B) = W(B;A) = w(p)w(q)m +
pq(1 ￿ ￿)m
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)2]
:
It follows straightforward that a social planner always prefers diversi￿cation over project
clustering. As in the two period model, diversi￿cation eliminates the possibility of excessive
duplication and reduces the time until both innovations are made.
We now analyze the market equilibrium and show that there is a tendency for ￿rms to
cluster and choose the easier project ￿rst in contrast to the social optimum of diversi￿cation.
When exactly one innovation is made, both ￿rms start pursuing the remaining R&D project
as in the social optimum. Let x denote the success probability of the remaining technology.




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ x)2;v1(x) =
￿1(x;x)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ x)2:
Denote V (i;j) to represent a ￿rm￿ s value function when the ￿rm engages in project i and
the other ￿rm engages in project j when no innovation has been made. When ￿rms choose
the same project, the value function is recursively de￿ned as
V (i;i) = x(1 ￿ x)￿v1(y)m + (1 ￿ x)x￿v0(y)m + x2￿
1
2
[v0(y) + v1(y)]m + (1 ￿ x)2￿V (i;i)
which yields
V (A;A) = V (B;B) =
1
2
￿m[v0(p) + v1(p)][v0(q) + v1(q)]:
When ￿rms pursue di⁄erent projects i and j with success probabilities x and y, respectively,
27we get
V (i;j) = x(1 ￿ y)￿v1(y)m + (1 ￿ x)y￿v0(x)m + xy￿
1
2
m + (1 ￿ x)(1 ￿ y)￿V (i;j):
As long as no innovation has been made, ￿rms simultaneously choose which project to
pursue in the current period. The following proposition compares the above value functions
and gives the project choice equilibrium as a function of the discount factor.
Proposition 6 In the in￿nite horizon model, there exists a ￿￿ such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿￿,
both ￿rms pursue the easier project A, while for ￿ < ￿￿, ￿rms diversify their choices over
the projects, i.e. one ￿rm chooses A and its rival B.
If the discount factor is su¢ ciently large, choosing project A is a dominant strategy and
(A;A) is the only project selection equilibrium. The reason is that for su¢ ciently large ￿,
what matters for each ￿rm is how many patents it has. The timing as to when the overall
innovations are made is of secondary importance. As a result, choosing the easier project
A regardless of the other ￿rm￿ s choice is optimal. In contrast, when ￿ is small, ￿rms have
incentives to diversify to hasten the innovation speed of the overall system. For instance, as
￿ ! 0; it is easy to check that V (A;A)￿V (B;A) ! ￿V (B;A) < 0. The stategic situation
becomes a one-shot game, and the two ￿rms diversify on their choices to maximize the
probability of both innovations in the current period.
5 Project Choice with Asymmetric Firms
In this section we extend the basic model to situations where ￿rms di⁄er in their capabilities
to innovate. In particular, we are interested to investigate the project choice equilibrium
when one ￿rm is dominant and has higher success rates in both technologies and the other
￿rm is more (or less) specialized in one project. We show that preemption incentives by
the dominant ￿rm can induce ine¢ cient clustering, ine¢ cient diversi￿cation and lead to
non-existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Suppose ￿rm 1 develops product A with probability qA = ￿q and product B with prob-
ability qB = (1 ￿ ￿)q; where ￿ 2 [1
2;1] represents the degree of specialization in technology
A. For ￿ = 1
2, ￿rm 1 is equally strong in both technologies; for ￿ = 1; ￿rm 1 is fully
specialized in technology A and inactive in B. Firm 2 is the dominant ￿rm and has a per
28period success rate of p (> q) with both technologies.28 Apart from this, the set-up follows
the benchmark model of section 2. Let ￿1(i;j) and ￿2(i;j) denote the expected pro￿ts of
￿rm 1 and 2, respectively, when ￿rm 1 engages in project i and ￿rm 2 in project j in the
￿rst period. These expressions are derived in the same way as the pro￿t functions in the
model of Section 2.29 We further assume that when both ￿rms are unsuccessful in the ￿rst
period, they can coordinate on the e¢ cient project choice in the second period, i.e. ￿rm 1
in market A and ￿rm 2 in market B. Lastly, it will be useful to note the following property
of the expected market shares ￿0(x;y) and ￿1(x;y).




2 if and only if x ￿ x0:
To understand the economic intuition, suppose for a moment that both ￿rms are successful
with probability one in both markets in period 1. If they choose the same market, the ￿rms
have a success rate in the remaining market of x and y, respectively. If they choose di⁄erent
projects, they have a certain market share of 1/2. The above remark implies that if the ￿rm
with success rate x has a su¢ ciently high innovation advantage in the remaining market,
then the ￿rm prefers clustering over diversifying. Vice versa, if the advantage is small or
the rival is more capable in the remaining market, then the ￿rm prefers to diversify.
Before proceeding with the equilibrium analysis, consider the socially e¢ cient outcome.
In the second period, the equilibrium and the socially e¢ cient choice coincide for any pos-
sible outcome for the ￿rst period. In period 1, the social planner maximizes the probability
that the two technologies are available at the end of period 2. While the dominant ￿rm
is equally good in both projects, ￿rm 1 is specialized in technology A. Hence, allocating
￿rms according to their relative innovation advantage is e¢ cient. Firm 1 engages in its
specialized technology A whereas ￿rm 2 pursues technology B in order to avoid duplication
in period 1.30
Lemma 5 The socially e¢ cient project allocation in the ￿rst period is to assign ￿rm 1 to
technology A and ￿rm 2 to technology B.
28We can say that ￿rm 2 has absolute advantages in both projects, but ￿rm 1 has a comparative advantage
in project A.
29See Appendix B for the de￿nition of the expected pro￿t functions.
30This result is formally derived in Appendix B.
29Now consider the market equilibrium in project choice. First consider the incentives of
￿rms to engage in the socially e¢ cient outcome (A;B). Suppose ￿rm 2 engages in project
B and verify that ￿1(A;B) > ￿1(B;B) if and only if
(1 ￿ p)
￿








￿ ￿0(qA;p)] + pqB
1
2
[1 ￿ ￿1(qA;p) ￿ ￿0(qA;p)] > 0:
Diversifying and engaging in technology A has three bene￿ts for ￿rm 1. The ￿rst term is
the relative advantage of pursuing A rather than B when the rival is not successful in the
￿rst period. As above, when its rival is inactive in period 1, ￿rm 1 maximizes its overall
expected market share by pursuing the technology in which it has the highest success rate.
Since ￿rm 1 is specialized in technology A, this term is strictly positive. The second term
is the di⁄erence in expected pro￿ts of a presence in market A relative to B in the event
that rival ￿rm 2 is successful. Pursuing A increases the success chances by qA ￿ qB and
leads to a higher expected market share. Finally, the last term is the gain from avoiding
R&D duplication when clustering in B which is by Remark 1 strictly positive. As a result,
(9) is always satis￿ed. Given the dominant ￿rm chooses project B, ￿rm 1 strictly prefers
to diversify and engage in market A. From this follows immediately that an equilibrium
(B;B) fails to exist.
Next consider the R&D project choice of the dominant ￿rm. Firm 2 chooses to diversify




[1 ￿ ￿1(p;qB) ￿ ￿0(p;qB)] ￿ (1 ￿ qA)[￿1(p;qB) ￿ ￿1(p;qA)]: (10)
This condition re￿ ects that the dominant ￿rm￿ s project choice is only concerned with out-
comes in which it is successful. If ￿rm 2 is not successful (which occurs with probability 1￿p
in both markets), it receives the same expected pro￿ts in both markets.31 Thus, the RHS
is the expected relative market share gain from clustering in A when ￿rm 2 succeeds while
￿rm 1 does not. In this case pursuing technology A in period 1 implies that the dominant
￿rm 2 faces a rival with a lower innovation capability qB = (1 ￿ ￿)q in the second period.
31In fact, with probability qA = ￿q ￿rm 1 is successful and ￿rm 2 receives a continuation pro￿t of
￿0(p;qB = (1 ￿ ￿)q) independent of the stage 1 project choice. Likewise, if ￿rm 1 is not successful ￿rm 2
receives pqA=2 no matter which technology it chose in stage 1.
30As discussed above, this is pro￿table if and only ￿rm 2￿ s own capability is larger than 2=3:
Hence, the RHS is positive if and only if p ￿ 2=3: The LHS is the expected relative gain
from diversifying when both ￿rms are successful in the ￿rst period. If ￿rm 2 pursues project
B, each ￿rm can secure itself half of the market. However, if the dominant ￿rm clusters, it
has a 50% chance of getting a patent on technology A plus it is more likely to succeed in
the other market in the second period. From Remark 1, it follows that if p is less than 2/3,
then diversifying is more pro￿table and the LHS is positive. By contrast, if p is su¢ ciently
high, then clustering dominates and the LHS is negative. Accordingly, it can be shown that
there exists a pA
2 (￿;q) ￿ 2=3 such that diversifying is pro￿table for the dominant ￿rm if
and only if p ￿ pA
2 (￿;q): Since ￿rm 1 has no incentive to deviate, (A;B) is an equilibrium
if p ￿ pA
2 (￿;q): Figure 2 depicts this threshold in an ￿ ￿ q space.
Second, consider ￿rms￿incentives to cluster in technology A. From (10) follows that
the dominant ￿rm does not deviate from (A,A) if and only if it innovation capability is
su¢ ciently high, p ￿ pA












[￿1(qB;p) ￿ ￿0(qB;p)] > pqB
1
2
[1 ￿ ￿1(qB;p) ￿ ￿0(qB;p)]:
The terms on the LHS correspond to the ￿rst two terms in (9). Choosing project A is
bene￿cial if the rival is not successful and yields a higher expected market share if both ￿rms
are successful. However, when ￿rm 2 is engaged in A, then these preemption bene￿ts have
to be weighed against the gain from diversi￿cation on the RHS. The relative advantage of
preemption in market A is higher, the more specialized ￿rm 1 is in project A. In particular, it
is shown in Appendix B that there exists a threshold value pA
1 (￿;q) such that if p < pA
1 (￿;q),
then ￿rm 1 diversi￿es whereas if p ￿ pA
1 (￿;q) it clusters in A. Accordingly, an equilibrium
(A,A) exists if p ￿ maxfpA
1 (￿;q);pA
2 (￿;q)g, i.e. when ￿rm 1 is su¢ ciently specialized and
￿rm 2￿ s innovation capability is high (see Figure 2 below for an illustration).
Finally, consider the incentives to form a (B,A) equilibrium. Clearly, ￿rm 1 does not
deviate if (11) is not satis￿ed. The dominant ￿rm 2 prefers project A while its rival engages




[1 ￿ ￿1(p;qA) ￿ ￿0(p;qA)] ￿ (1 ￿ qB)[￿1(p;qA) ￿ ￿1(p;qB)]: (12)
A similar trade-o⁄ as in (10) arises. The LHS are the gains from diversifying when both
￿rms innovate. The RHS are the expected gains from clustering in B when ￿rm 2 is the
sole innovator. The only qualitative di⁄erence is that when ￿rm 2 is the sole innovator and
clusters, it faces a rival with a higher innovation capability in the second period. This is
pro￿table if and only if its own capability is less than 2/3. Two cases arises. Clustering
dominates diversifying if either p<2/3 and p ￿ pB
2 ; or, if p>2/3 and p ￿ pB
2 : In the former
case, the gains from clustering when ￿rm 2 is the sole innovator outweigh the bene￿t from
clustering. In the latter case, the LHS and the RHS are negative but if p is large and
￿ small, the relative loss from clustering when only ￿rm 2 innovates is smaller. We can
characterize the project choice equilibrium as follows.
Proposition 7 Consider the project choice equilibrium with a specialized and a dominant
￿rm. (i) The socially e¢ cient project choice obtains in equilibrium if and only if ￿rm 1 is not
too specialized and ￿rm 2￿ s innovation advantage is small. (ii) There is excessive clustering
in A if and only if ￿rm 1 is su¢ ciently specialized and ￿rm 2 su¢ ciently dominant. (iii)
There exist parameter values such that (B,A) is the unique project choice equilibrium. (iv)
There exist parameter values such that no pure strategy project choice equilibrium exists.
The project choice equilibrium may di⁄er from the socially e¢ cient outcome because the
dominant ￿rm 2 has an incentive to preempt by ￿rst developing the technology its rival
specializes in. This allows ￿rm 2 to secure itself a higher expected market share in technology
A. Such a preemption strategy is pro￿table if the dominant ￿rm has a high success rate
across both technologies and its rival is su¢ ciently specialized. A high innovation capability
makes preemption more pro￿table and reduces the cost of duplicating its rival￿ s R&D e⁄ort.
A high degree of specialization implies that ￿rm 1 has no incentive to avoid competition for
a patent in A by switching to project B.
Interestingly, for lower degrees of specialization of ￿rm 1, ￿rm 2￿ s preemption strategy
leads to a (B,A) equilibrium in which both ￿rms are ine¢ ciently allocated relative to the
social optimum. In this equilibrium, the specialist ￿rm 1 has su¢ cient expertise in its less
e¢ cient project B in order to make a switch pro￿table. While ￿rm 1 avoids competition from
32Figure 2: Project choice equilibrium with asymmetric ￿rm capabilities
the dominant ￿rm, ￿rm 2 maintains its preemption stronghold on ￿rm 1￿ s specialization
technology. This equilibrium is unique if ￿rm 1 has an intermediate degree of specialization
and ￿rm 2 is moderately dominant.
Finally, as ￿rm 2 becomes more dominant and ￿rm 1￿ s degree of specialization decreases,
the preemption strategy changes. Instead of preempting the project that ￿rm 1 is best at,
￿rm 2 tries to engage in the same technology as its rival. However, ￿rm 1 has the exact
opposite strategy and prefers to avoid head-to-head competition by choosing a di⁄erent
R&D project than the dominant ￿rm. As a result, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.32
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes biases in the project choice of complementary innovations that are used
in combination to produce a ￿nal product. In order to highlight the e⁄ects of rivalry on
project selections, we set up a model in which there is no bias under monopoly. We show
that, relative to the socially optimal allocation, R&D competition induces selection biases in
32In the resulting mixed strategy equilibrium ￿rm k 2 f1;2g chooses project A with probability
￿k =
￿￿k(A;B) + ￿￿k(B;A) ￿ ￿￿k(A;A) ￿ ￿￿k(B;B)
￿￿k(A;B) ￿ ￿￿k(B;B)
where ￿k is the rival￿ s subscript.
33the choice of R&D projects. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow
innovating ￿rms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components.
This hold-up problem induces ￿rms to preemptively claim stakes on the property rights of
the complementary technologies. When there is asymmetry across project with respect to
innovation success rates, ￿rms have an incentive to excessively cluster their R&D e⁄orts on a
relatively easier technology. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several extensions
including number of ￿rms, number of R&D stages, free entry, intermediate licensing and an
in￿nite horizon. We also analyze selection biases in complementary R&D projects that arise
when ￿rms di⁄er in research capabilities. In particular, we demonstrate that a dominant
￿rm has incentives to excessively engage in either the same technology as its weaker rival
or in the technology in which its rival has relatively less research capabilities.
Recently, the FTC and several authors have expressed concerns regarding patents issued
for obvious or nearly obvious inventions, which can be used as blocking patents and thus
hinder the developments of new products.33 Our analysis points out that excessive resource
allocation towards such obvious inventions can further exacerbate the problem. The ine¢ -
cient clustering in R&D project choice identi￿ed in our paper calls for policy interventions
and patent reform. Shapiro (2006) highlighted the attractiveness of prior user rights as a
way to partially correct for various ine¢ ciencies that arise for isolated innovations. Interest-
ingly, the feature of prior user rights that favors sole innovations over joint innovations has
a bene￿cial e⁄ect in our case of complementary innovations. Prior user rights can mitigate
the problem of preemptive duplication and promote diversi￿cation of project choice, which
can hasten the expected time of arrival for all innovations required for the ￿nal product.
33See Federal Trade Commission (2011) and Ja⁄e and Lerner (2004).
34Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2. The ￿rst order condition, P0Q(N￿nA)￿P(nA)Q0 = 0 can be written
as
￿(1 ￿ p)nA(1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)N￿nA)ln(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ q)N￿nA(1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA)ln(1 ￿ q) = 0





A) = 0. We show that the unique solution implies no
A < no
B , or equivalently no
A <





(1 ￿ q)nA [(1 ￿ q)N ￿ (1 ￿ q)nA][ln(1 ￿ p)]2
￿ (1 ￿ q)N￿nA ln(1 ￿ q)[2(1 ￿ p)nA ln(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA)ln(1 ￿ q)] < 0
for all nA 2 [0;N]. Next, check that ￿(0) = ￿[1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)N]ln(1 ￿ p) > 0. It remains to
show that ￿(N=2) < 0. For this, note that ￿(N=2)jp=q = 0 and
@￿(N=2)
@p
= 2 ￿ 2(1 ￿ q)N=2 + N ln(1 ￿ p) ￿ N(1 ￿ q)N=2[ln(1 ￿ p) ￿ ln(1 ￿ q)] < 0:






(1 ￿ p)N=2￿1(1 ￿ q)N=2￿1[ln(1 ￿ p) ￿ ln(1 ￿ q)] < 0:




It follows that @￿(N=2)=@p < 0 for all q > 0. It is then immediate that ￿(N=2) < 0 for all
p > q. It follows that no
A < N=2: Finally, consider the comparative statics of no
A with respect
to p and q. Since @￿(nA)=@nA < 0; it holds that signfdno
A=dpg=signf@￿=@pgjnA=no
A.
Using the fact that in the optimum,
ln(1 ￿ q) = ln(1 ￿ p)
(1 ￿ p)nA(1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)N￿nA)












(1 ￿ q)nA ￿ (1 ￿ q)N
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA [1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA + nA ln(1 ￿ p)] < 0
since the value in the squared bracket is zero at p = 0 and strictly decreasing in p. Similarly,






A = (1 ￿ q)N￿nA￿1[(1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA)(1 + (N ￿ nA)ln(1 ￿ q)) ￿ (N ￿ nA)(1 ￿ p)nA ln(1 ￿ p)]
=
(1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)nA)(1 ￿ q)N￿1
(1 ￿ q)nA ￿ (1 ￿ q)N [(1 ￿ q)N￿nA ￿ 1 ￿ (N ￿ nA)ln(1 ￿ q)] > 0
since the value in the squared bracket is zero at q = 0 and strictly increasing in q. The
lemma follows. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. In order to show that b no
A < no
A it is su¢ cient to show that (i) c W(nA)
is strictly concave and (ii) c W0(no
A) < 0: Let us start with the second part. Di⁄erentiating
c W(nA) with respect to nA yields
dc W(nA)
dnA
= P0(nA)Q(N ￿ nA) ￿ P(nA)Q0(N ￿ nA) + P(nA)Q(N)Q0(N ￿ nA)
+ P0(nA)(1 ￿ Q(N ￿ nA))Q(N) ￿ P(N)Q0(N ￿ nA)(1 ￿ P(nA))
+ P0(nA)Q(N ￿ nA)P(N) + ￿o(1 ￿ P(nA))Q0(N ￿ nA) + ￿o(1 ￿ Q(N ￿ nA))P0(nA):
At nA = no























(1 ￿ p)N ln(1 ￿ p)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)N (￿1 + ￿2) ￿ 0
for all no
A ￿ N=2 since
￿1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)N[1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)no
A][(1 ￿ q)N ￿ (1 ￿ q)2no
A] ￿ 0 and
￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ q)no
A[(1 ￿ p)N ￿ (1 ￿ p)2no
A][(1 ￿ q)N ￿ (1 ￿ q)no
A] ￿ 0:
36Next check concavity by taking the second derivative which yields
dc W2(nA)
(dnA)2 = [ln(1 ￿ p) ￿ ln(1 ￿ q)]2￿ + ln(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ p)N+nA[ln(1 ￿ q) ￿ 2ln(1 ￿ p)]
￿ [ln(1 ￿ q)]2(1 ￿ q)2N￿nA < 0





f￿(1 ￿ q)2N[1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)no
A] ￿ (1 ￿ p)N(1 ￿ q)no
A[(1 ￿ q)nA ￿ (1 ￿ q)N]
￿ (1 ￿ p)no
A(1 ￿ q)N+no
A[1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)N￿no
A]g < 0:
The lemma follows. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. To prove the lemma we show that (i) @[￿A(nA;N￿nA)￿￿B(nA;N￿
nA)]=@nA < 0 and (ii) ￿A(N=2;N=2) > ￿B(N=2;N=2). First, observe that






+ P(nA)[1 ￿ Q(N ￿ nA)]Q(N)
1
nA
￿ P(nA)Q(N ￿ nA)
1
N ￿ nA























(1 ￿ q)nA f[(1 ￿ q)nA ￿ (1 ￿ q)2N]ln(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ q)2N ln(1 ￿ q)g < 0:














= (1 ￿ q)N￿nA￿1f(1 ￿ p)N+nA ln(1 ￿ p) + [1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)N+nA]ln(1 ￿ q)g < 0:










[1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)N=2]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)N=2]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)N]
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)N]
=
1 + (1 ￿ q)N=2
1 + (1 ￿ p)N=2 > 1
Thus, P(N=2)Q(N) > Q(N=2)P(N). In addition, [1￿Q(N=2)] > [1￿P(N=2)]: Therefore,
￿A(N=2;N=2) ￿ ￿B(N=2;N=2) > 0: ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. It is useful to rewrite the value functions as
V (A;A) = V (B;B) =
2￿pq￿(p)￿(q)m
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)
; V (A;B) =
pq[1 + ￿￿(p) + 3￿￿(q)]m
2[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)]
and V (B;A) =
pq[1 + 3￿￿(p) + ￿￿(q)]m
2[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)]
where
￿(x) ￿
(2 ￿ x)(1 ￿ x)
2[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ x)2]
> 0; ￿0(x) = ￿
3 ￿ 2x + ￿(1 ￿ x)2
2[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ x)2]2 < 0:
From ￿0(x) < 0 and p > q follows that V (A;B) > V (B;A).
1. First, we show that V (A;B) > V (B;B), which means that both ￿rms choosing the
di¢ cult project B cannot be an equilibrium. We prove this indirectly by using the following
relationship,
V (A;B) + V (B;A) = W(A;B)
= W(B;B) +
pq(1 ￿ ￿)m
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)2]
> W(B;B) = 2V (B;B):
Prove by contradiction. Suppose that V (A;B) ￿ V (B;B). Since V (A;B) > V (B;A)
it must hold that V (B;A) < V (B;B): Taken together, we have V (A;B) + V (B;A) <
2V (B;B), which yields a contradiction. Hence, V (A;B) > V (B;B):
382. From V (A;B) > V (B;B) follows that clustering in A is the unique equilibrium if and only
if V (A;A) > V (B;A): Otherwise, two equilibria exist in which ￿rms choose di⁄erent project.
In what follows we show that there exists one ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that V (A;A) > V (B;A) if
and only if ￿ ￿ ￿￿: To see this, observe that V (A;A) and V (B;A) are continuous in ￿,
lim
￿!1
[V (A;A) ￿ V (B;A)] =
(p ￿ q)m





[V (A;A) ￿ V (B;A)] = ￿lim
￿!0
[V (B;A)] < 0
Thus, there exist at least one ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that V (A;A) = V (B;A). Note that given
p;q < 1, V (A;A)￿V (B;A) is di⁄erentiable with respect to ￿ everywhere. So, to prove the
claim, it is enough to show that @ [V (A;A) ￿ V (B;A)]=@￿ evaluated at ￿ = ￿￿ is positive.








2￿(p)￿(q) + 2￿￿￿￿(p)￿(q) + 2￿￿￿(p)￿￿(q)





(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)
=
V (A;A)


























[3￿(p) + ￿(q) + 3￿￿￿￿(p) + ￿￿￿￿(q)]
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)]
+
V (B;A)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)




[3￿￿￿￿(p) + ￿￿￿￿(q) ￿ 1=￿￿]
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)]
+
V (B;A)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)




[3￿￿￿￿(p) + ￿￿￿￿(q) ￿ 1=￿￿]
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)]
+
V (A;A)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)




[3￿￿￿￿(p) + ￿￿￿￿(q) ￿ 1=￿￿]
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)]
+ pqm
2￿￿￿(p)￿(q)
1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)
(BA)
Subtracting (BA) from (AA), and dividing it by pqm=2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)], we obtain





























2(1 ￿ p)2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2￿
+ 2(1 ￿ q)2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2￿
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)[2q(1 ￿ p) + (p + q)]
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
=
(1 ￿ p)2 [1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)]
[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
+
2(1 ￿ q)2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2￿
￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)(p + q)
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
>
(1 ￿ p)2 [1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)]
[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
+
2(1 ￿ q)2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2￿
￿ 2￿￿(1 ￿ q)2p
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
(* p > q)
=
(1 ￿ p)2 [1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)]
[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
+
2(1 ￿ q)2 [1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p(1 ￿ p))]
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ p)2][1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ q)2]
> 0;
which completes the proof. ￿
Appendix B
De￿nition of pro￿t functions. Suppose ￿rms choose the same project i: Let xk denote
the success probability of ￿rm k = 1;2 in this project and yk in the other project j. Then,




[￿0(yk;y￿k) + ￿1(yk;y￿k)]m + xk(1 ￿ x￿k)￿1(yk;y￿k)m +








m + xk(1 ￿ y￿k)￿1(yk;y￿k)m + y￿k(1 ￿ xk)￿0(xk;x￿k)m +




Proof of Remark 1. Verify that
￿0(x;y) + ￿1(x;y) =
1
2
(x(3 ￿ 2y) + y) ￿ 1
40if and only if









which establishes the property. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5. The expected welfare di⁄erence between (A,B) and (A,A) is
￿1(A;B)+￿2(A;B)￿[￿1(A;A)+￿2(A;A)] = pq(1￿p)[(1￿￿q)(3￿￿1)+￿q(2￿￿1)] ￿ 0
for ￿ ￿ 1=2: The expected welfare di⁄erence between (A,B) and (B,B) is
￿1(A;B) + ￿2(A;B) ￿ [￿1(B;A) + ￿2(B;A)] = pq(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿q)(3￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 0
for ￿ ￿ 1=2: expected welfare di⁄erence between (A,B) and (A,A) is
￿1(A;B) + ￿2(A;B) ￿ [￿1(B;A) + ￿2(B;A)] = pq(1 ￿ p)(2￿ ￿ 1)(3 ￿ q ￿ ￿q) ￿ 0
for ￿ ￿ 1=2: ￿
Equilibrium cut-o⁄ values. First rewrite (10) as
1
4
aq[2 ￿ 3p + (1 ￿ ￿)(2p ￿ 1)q] ￿
1
4








9(2￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿q) + 3￿(3 ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)q)
:
Next consider (11). Simplifying the LHS and RHS, respectively, gives
(2￿ ￿ 1)[2 ￿ p ￿ (1 ￿ p)(3￿ ￿ 1)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[2 ￿ p ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(3 ￿ 2p)]:
Both sides are linear and decreasing in p. At p = 0, the LHS is larger than the RHS i⁄
(3￿ ￿ 2)(2 ￿ (1 + ￿)q) ￿ 0 which holds if ￿ ￿ 2=3: At p = 1, the LHS is larger than the
RHS i⁄ 3￿ ￿ 2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2q ￿ 0 which holds if ￿ ￿ ￿0 where 1=2 < ￿0 < 2=3: It follows
that for ￿ ￿ ￿0, this condition is never satis￿ed. For ￿ ￿ 2=3 it is always satis￿ed. For
￿0 ￿ ￿ < 2=3; there exists a b pA
1 (￿;q) such that (11) holds if and only if p ￿ b pA
1 (￿;q).
41Finally consider (12). Simplifying the LHS and RHS, respectively, gives
(1 ￿ ￿)[2 ￿ 3p + ￿q(2p ￿ 1)] ￿ (2￿ ￿ 1)(2 ￿ 3p)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)q]:
Both sides are linear in p. At p = 0, the LHS is larger than the RHS i⁄(2￿3￿)(2￿(1￿￿)q) ￿
0 or ￿ ￿ 2=3: At p = 1, the LHS is larger than the RHS i⁄ 3￿ ￿ 2 + (1 ￿ ￿)2q ￿ 0 which
holds if ￿ ￿ ￿0 where 1=2 < ￿0 < 2=3: It follows that for ￿ ￿ ￿0, there exists a b pB
2 (￿;q)
such that (12) holds if and only if p ￿ b pA
1 (￿;q). For ￿0 ￿ ￿ < 2=3; the condition always
holds. For ￿ ￿ 2=3; there exists a b pB
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